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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to expose the relationships between State and Violence in 
the cases of extrajudicial executions that occurred massively during Álvaro Uribe’s 
Presidential tenure, showing how Democratic Security policy represents the 
framework of such legitimization. In this sense, it puts at stake the classical 
definitions of the State concerning the monopoly of the use of force by posing the 
following question at the center of the debate: Is it only the legal use of force that 
the State controls? It will be based on a case study of extrajudicial executions 
which occurred in the Eastern Antioquia region of Colombia and then it will analyze 
the discourses of various state agents about the cases, to show the patterns of 
creation of a combat scenario for the illegal killings and to analyse the official 
responses as denial discourses regarding the cases nationwide. Data have been 
collected from newspapers, magazines, reports from State agencies, NGOs and 
from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions. The above 
patterns of State responses and the cases themselves show how legality is 
constructed and legitimized in violent ways in regarding extrajudicial executions 
cases in Colombia: by silencing the context, dealing with bodies and how they are 
recovered and counted, denying the facts, and denying the victims. 
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“Acá hay un reporte del ejército que dice que el ejército los mató, pero que ellos 
eran guerrilleros. Dije yo: Guerrilleros? Mi hijo no es ningún guerrillero y así me 
toque 
morirme, hacer lo que sea, pero voy a buscarme las 
pruebas que más pueda y las llevo a la fiscalía 
de que el hijo mío no era ningún guerrillero” 
La Paisa, madre de Andrés Palacios “El Paisita”, 
 víctima de Soacha 
 
“Here is an Army report that says the army killed them, but they were guerrilla 
members. I said: Guerrilla members? My son is not a Guerrilla member and 
even if I have to die, do whatever it takes, I will search all the 
evidence I can and taken to the prosecutor 
as proof that my son was not a rebel” 
La Paisa, mother of Andrés Palacios “El Paisita”, 
 victim from Soacha 
Introduction1 
In the midst of diverse violences that coexist in Colombia and that degrade its 
internal armed conflict, emerge the badly-named “false positives” (falsos positivos). 
These are are“unlawful killings of civilians, staged by the security forces to look like 
lawful killings in combat of guerrillas or criminals” (Alston 2010, p. 8). The term 
positive (positivo) refers to Military forces slang used to name the cases in which 
they have killed or arrested an alleged combatant of any non-state armed group. 
Such practices involve extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in terms of 
International Humanitarian Law which may also amount to a war crime –Willful 
Killings – committed by a person by or with the direct support of the State.2 
With the implementation of the Colombian government´s Democratic Security 
Policy, the number and victims of these cases started to be dramatically publicized 
in 2008 in the mass media after the revelation of the disappearance and 
subsequent killing of 11 young men from Soacha, Cundinamarca. They were found 
in a mass grave in Ocaña, Norte de Santander, after being reported as guerrilla 
members who had died in combat. The wide media attention that these reports 
generated, along with the insistence of the victims’ mothers and relatives, the 
intervention of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)civil society organizations 
and even of some state agents – such as the regional ombudsman of Soacha 
(Personero de Soacha) – contributed to the rapid diffusion of the infamous events 
and as a result, more victims´ allegations became widely publicized in the country. 
The main argument was the claim that these young people were neither guerrillas 
nor criminals. 
The Soacha cases are just a few of the many others reported through the country. 
Hence, the visit and the investigation carried in June 2009 by the United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions for Colombia, Philip Alston, enabled 
him to say “(…) while the Soacha killings were undeniably blatant and obscene, my 
investigations show that they were but the tip of the iceberg” (Alston 2009, p. 2). 
In his later report to UN General Assembly Alston asserted that “It is clear from my 
investigations that members of Colombia´s security forces have committed a 
                                                 
1 All the quotations from reports, newspapers, magazines and other documents in Spanish have been 
translated to English by the author. 
2 For a complete definition see Rome Statute Article 8.2 (i) Willful killing (United Nations 1999-2002). 
However, extra-judicial execution and enforced Disappearances often go hand in hand, constituting a 
complex crime (Nyamuya 2002). Enforced disappearances entail the arrest, detention or abduction of 
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or 
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a 
prolonged period of time”. Art. 7..2 (i), (ibid). This will be discussed in more detaildetail in section 3. 
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significant number of unlawful killings and that the falsos positivos pattern has been 
repeated around the country” (Alston 2010, p. 9). One of the highest figures in the 
country comes from the province of Antioquia, within which the Eastern Antioquia 
region (Oriente Antioqueño) in turn presents the highest figure. 
Taking this context into account, this thesis is focused on the institutional use of 
force which moves beyond legality but also sets it up. Such use constitutes an 
instance of the relationships between State and Violence in which the illegal events 
analyzed were staged to present them as legal in order to maintain the legitimacy 
of the activities of the Military forces. Thus, I aim to explore the relationships 
between the State and Violence in the specific context of the extrajudicial 
executions that happened in the Eastern Antioquia region (Oriente Antioqueño). 
In order to understand the previous analysis the thesis will approach and study this 
region´s cases and the circumstances in which they have been taking place. This 
will be done by analyzing a case study based on documents.3 
The Eastern Antioquia region was selected for the case study because the analysis 
of the cases provides a perspective for analyzing other cases in the country, even 
though there are some specific differences according to the particularities of the 
conflict in each zone. The facts throughout the country are so similar and result in 
very similar outcomes: the intensification of special operations for the consolidation 
of democratic security based on the fight against a specific enemy in certain parts 
of the country and the achievement of rewards. 
The relationship between the State and Violence in the cases of extrajudicial 
executions needs to be thematized and exposed in order to understand the 
complexities of law in contexts in which the State itself is moving between the 
borders of legality and illegality by means of different uses of violence: those 
embodied in the practices for creating a combat scenario for the illegal killings and 
the responses provided by the State regarding the problematic of extrajudicial 
executions nationwide. 
This thesis adopts the perspective that legality is also constructed and legitimized in 
violent ways: denying the facts, denying the victims, silencing the context and 
dealing with bodies and how they are recovered and counted. It will provide a 
possibility for analyzing how legality is constructed in a specific conjuncture in 
which the State and Violence are closely related to each other in the specific 
political context of Álvaro Uribe’s Presidential tenure, showing how the Democratic 
Security policy represents the framework of such legitimization. 
In this sense, it puts at stake the classical definitions of the State concerning the 
monopoly of the use of force by posing the following question at the center of the 
debate: Is it only the legal use of force that the State controls? Framing the 
question in this way, that is by suggesting that there is more than one kind of state 
force apart from the legal one, will reveal that the reasons for extrajudicial 
executions reflect the situation that the control of force is defined by its excesses. 
Furthermore, the aim will be to demonstrate that the definitions and justification of 
the uses of force by State security forces are constructed in the very events in 
which force is deployed, enabling State agents to elaborate discursive ways for 
managing the characteristics of and the accountability for these activities. 
As these assertions show, the Colombian context offers a different background of 
the development of the state and it calls for a reexamination of the European state 
tradition, in contrast with the ideas and contexts on the basis of which the state has 
been studied in other latitudes. 
                                                 
3 Documents used for this research are newspapers, magazines, reports from State agencies, NGOs and 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, which come from different and 
contrasting sources. 
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To achieve the above aims, this thesis will be divided into four sections. In the first 
part the state will be put at stake by analyzing different approaches that develop 
the relations between the State and Violence. Then, I will give a brief account of 
the historical background of the violence in Colombia which will provide the general 
context for the specific case of extrajudicial executions in Eastern Antioquia Region 
and its analysis. For these purposes I will first analyze the mass media coverage of 
the case and an NGO approach, followed by the responses of the government and 
other state agents to those approaches. Finally, I will draw some conclusions from 
the perspective of the Violent state as a way of uncovering the assumptions related 
to the classical approaches about the State and Violence and the significance of the 
margin as the space from which it is possible for victims´ relatives to express 
themselves against the criminality of the law. 
1. Constructions of the Violent State: The State at stake 
In this section some approaches to the relations between the State and Violence 
will be discussed and analyzed to then present the chosen theoretical grounds 
based on which the cases of extrajudicial executions and state responses to them 
will be read. 
It is common in social sciences, especially in political sciences and legal studies, to 
define the State`s existence mainly in terms of the protection or deployment of 
force within a territory, or in its relations controlled through violent means to 
achieve certain goals, and its ability to establish the power to punish those who use 
force without an authorization from the State itself (Weber 1957, Benjamin 1927, 
Nozick 1974 cited in PNUD 2003, Abrams 1988 cited in Sharma and Gupta 2006). 
These assumptions are theoretical ones and have a sort of a priori effect in the idea 
of the state over society (Das and Poole 2004). Nonetheless, these perspectives are 
very relevant if we wish to reconfigure state analysis from the assumptions that 
underpin it and the performance of its institutions and officers. 
The idea of different kinds of force, violence or power that the State controls, when 
we talk about the monopoly of force, implies the need to locate oneself in the legal 
and historical conditions that made it possible (Benjamin 1927). It is necessary, 
then, to explore the State from a contrast between its theoretical understanding 
and the everyday practices that are taking place and which are putting at stake 
order as one of its theoretical ends (Arendt 1970, Weber 1957). 
Talking about a Violent State makes it necessary to bring the notion of state back 
to an analysis of its main features so as to put them at stake. An instance of this 
sort of analysis will be done by taking into account practices such as extrajudicial 
executions. This makes it possible to assert that state configurations are relying on 
an extensive kind of practice that necessarily shape it even from the concept of 
force. 
Based on the previous considerations, it is important not to encapsulate the uses of 
the concepts of force/violence/power with an essentialist idea about legality/ 
illegality or proportionality/disproportionality, because the uses of force by the 
State are better readable in the blurred boundaries of these categories, as the 
extrajudicial execution cases are able to show. 
These cases show that the notion of the state is not a fixed concept. On the 
contrary, it is a constant construction. For this reason it is crucial that any analysis 
of the uses of force by the state should show the scenarios, practices and social 
actors in which force is used to see how the state is represented. 
Thus, it is necessary to consider the relationship between the State and Violence to 
give them a meaning in the context of Colombian governments, particularly that of 
President Uribe, without ignoring the context of the Colombian internal armed 
conflict for over four decades. In this context, even if there has not been a formal 
declaration of a state of emergency, there are spaces that involve an ongoing 
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suspension of law, by means of exceptional measures, as will be show in the cases, 
but it has created a whole picture of violence and conflict from a Colombian 
government policy that directs the assertive use of force, which promises to save 
democracy. 
It is important to note that it is the Colombian government measures that are 
presented as exceptional rather than the regime that allows them. They are 
presented as military operations in the framework of democratic security, but as 
exceptional in the sense of what they will allow, that is to defeat terrorism. This 
action must be strong, and the sample of results confirms the need to continue with 
what is being done. It is not a state of emergency in the legal technical sense of the 
term, but the exception as the place/situation in which the law is built in its 
suspension and as such determines the circumstances of this obliteration. 
Thus, the concept of margin of the State (Das and Poole 2004) will be used for 
reading the political and geographical context of extrajudicial execution cases in 
Eastern Antioquia Region, as well as the patterns for their materialization. The 
margin is the site of practice where “the state is constantly refounding its modes of 
order and lawmaking” (Das and Poole 2004, p.7). 
The margin is located in terms of the boundaries built from the perspective of state 
order-making. Hence, the margin also entails the necessity to see those who 
inhabit it. The subjects in the margin are individuals who suffer a reconstituting 
process through the implementation of new regulations. 
In the case of Colombian extrajudicial execution practices, fighting against an 
enemy in zones where territorial control needs to be recovered by the State 
justifies strong interventions and, at the same time, shows how the enemy is 
materially and discursively built through legality (Fitzpatrick 2001 cited in Das and 
Poole 2004). In this way, the margin emerges as a crucial space in which the State 
legitimizes its own uses of force. 
It is important to note that the uses of violence that are instantiated in the cases of 
extrajudicial executions in Colombia require an analysis that doesn’t choose 
dichotomies, but reads the categories which underpin the practice of the State. The 
killing in cold blood of citizens and even of guerrilla members, paramilitary and / or 
criminal actors that are not in combat, to then present them as legitimate targets 
by constructing a legal scenario such as a combat, symbolizes how the law is built 
in the very act of murder. So reading these actions requires also to insist that the 
Law´s very foundations in Colombia are built materially upon the uses of violence, 
and therefore this is a scenario that requires not just uncovering the historical 
conditions that gave rise to it, but also those practices that can support them. 
In these relationships between the State and Violence, in addition to the patterns of 
extrajudicial executions of extrajudicial executions, legality also has been reinforced 
by institutional discourses of denial of the victims or statements that even though 
the cases exist, they are not equivalent to the excessive amount of complaints. 
This second aspect of the relationship between the State and Violence will be 
analyzed drawing on the ideas of Official Denial (Cohen 2001) and the instruments 
of State tyranny (Nyamuya 2002) to analyze how some of the discourses from 
state officers undermine the suffering of victims and deepen it, in contrast to the 
suffering of others, and also the reconstruction of political and legal denials of the 
facts and the genealogy of their occurrence. 
For Stanley Cohen (2001), official denial consists of the forms in which 
governments respond to massive violations to human rights. These forms “do not 
assert that the event did not happen. They seek to negotiate or impose a different 
construction of the event from what might appear the case” (Cohen 1993 cited in 
Whyte 2009, p. 147). Section four will draw on the concepts of interpretive denial, 
partial acknowledgment and denial of the victims (Cohen 2001) regarding the 
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discursive responses given by different state agents to specific events developed 
after the Soacha cases were uncovered. 
In relation to State Tyranny, Nyamuya (2002) talks about how forced 
disappearances and extrajudicial executions are often simultaneously presented 
through formal and informal practices of states, even when they happen in 
democratic regimes, as in the case of Colombia. However, the latter reveals, at the 
same time, the formality of this democracy and the necessity of going beyond the 
labels to understand the commission of extrajudicial executions. For this purpose, 
Nyamuya presented three main aspects that delineate institutional State Tyranny, 
which are: i) Organizational complexity; ii) the Iron Curtain of Secrecy and iii) 
Immunity to judicial process. These three aspects encompass the whole process 
through which the State implements sophisticated techniques to obscure and make 
difficult the investigation of the facts and then shield the state security forces from 
the denunciations of activist organizations and victims´ relatives, including the legal 
issues involved in the prosecution of military agents (Nyamuya 2002), as will be 
seen in section four. 
Accordingly, it is possible to approach the concept of the violent state not as a 
contradiction, but as a tautology, that is to say, violence as a fundamental 
phenomenon for the construction and operation of the Colombian state, as 
exemplified by the extrajudicial executions in Eastern Antioquia Region. 
2. Background to Extrajudicial Execution Cases: Colombia and the 
Democratic Security Policy 2002-2010 
In this section I will first give a brief account of the historical process of armed 
conflict and then explain the main features of Democratic Security Policy 
implemented since 2002 during Alvaro Uribe´s government. After this, I will show 
how the necessity to recover territorial control created some territories as spaces 
for special military operations, constructing in this way a margin in which some 
practices were formulated for demonstrating results, as will be explained in the 
next section. 
Colombia has been suffering an internal armed conflict for more than five decades. 
Throughout all its phases until now, three main illegal armed actors can be traced: 
the main guerrillas groups, FARC –Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia- 
and ELN –Ejército de liberación Nacional-, and the paramilitary groups AUC -
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia- which acted as a proxy of the State´s Armed 
Forces themselves. The illegal activities of State Armed forces should also be 
considered when examining the illegality of the executions (Semana 2007). It is 
necessary to take into account the complexity of the factors inherent in the 
development of this conflict in order to understand its changes and the role and 
involvement of each of the actors that intervenes in it. 
This context is very relevant in terms of understanding the changes in its 
management that have been asserted during Alvaro Uribe´s government. The 
framework of Colombian armed conflict is specially convoluted “(…). Formulations 
used include portraying it as an, “eight-faced monster” which can be attributed to 
three specific circumstances.. First, the multiplicity of actors involved—guerrillas 
with diverse forms of Marxist allegiances, paramilitary groups with different origins, 
drug lords as well as smaller and medium-sized traffickers, and an array of different 
state actors. .Second, a variety of geographical, historical, cultural, and ethnic 
settings in which the war is being waged; and third, the complications caused by 
the exceptionally long duration of the various confrontations" (Díaz 2007, p. 2). 
The internal armed conflict has its roots in 1950 with the bipartisan clashes 
between the Liberals and Conservatives for political power. This period is known as 
The Violence (La Violencia) and the killings occurred in large numbers. As an 
attempt to stop it, the two political parties made an agreement for sharing 
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governmental power, taking turns to exert it. This agreement is known as the 
National Front (Frente Nacional). 
Although urban violence diminished as a result of this agreement, in the 
countryside the violence remained, because the National Front could not demobilize 
the Guerrillas there because of the social component of the latter: “Even though 
peasant guerrilla groups started as self-defense organizations they always had 
social goals, specially marked by the land reform in the country. After the National 
Front, these guerrillas groups intensified their revolutionary character and started 
to fight for political power” (PNUD 2003, p. 28). Nonetheless, it is important to take 
into account that the nature of this internal conflict has been very controversial in 
social science studies. Additionally, these guerrillas groups became FARC in joining 
with the PCC (Colombian Communist Party), which was excluded from the National 
Front (PNUD, 2003). 
The emergence of paramilitary groups, however, has been different. It can be 
traced to 1960, when the State allowed armed civilian militias. But the strongest 
activity of these initial self-defense groups increased in the 80´s and 90´s, when 
they were created “under the auspices of the official military forces, to defend the 
persons and properties of landowners, wealthy ranchers and merchants from the 
action of the Marxist guerrillas” (Díaz, 2007, p. 3). Hence, the Paramilitarism 
project differs from the Guerrillas because its political aims do not include 
opposition to the status quo. 
Indeed, paramilitary forces operate with the awareness and sometimes, with the 
support of State military forces. This joint activity is publicly known nowadays, as 
Díaz (2007, p. 4) points out: "In many cases, the paramilitary fronts conducted 
joint operations with official military battalions, or counted on open or implicit 
cooperation of military, police, and intelligence forces. Indeed, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights recently addressed allegations of collusion between 
paramilitary fronts and state security forces. In five cases, the Court declared the 
state of Colombia responsible for human rights violations involving paramilitary and 
state actors". 
With the emergence and development of the different long-term scales of conflict 
and its actors, each government has attempted various measures to resolve it. One 
of the main attempts to develop peace negotiations with the FARC guerrilla was 
developed during the Andrés Pastrana government (1998-2002), but it failed. 
In 2002 Álvaro Uribe Vélez became the president of Colombia by conducting a 
campaign focused on the idea of recovering stability mainly in terms of national 
security. He implemented this idea through the Democratic Security policy, which 
insists on “recovering order and security” as “cardinal requirements for the validity 
of liberties and human rights” (Presidencia de la República and Ministerio de 
Defensa 2003, p. 5). He added that 
“Security is understood at first glance not as State security, neither as citizen 
security without the state´s concurrence, but as the protection by the State of the 
citizen and of democracy with the cooperation, solidarity and commitment of the 
whole society. Hence, Democratic Security is founded on three pillars: protection of 
the human rights of all citizens; protection of values, plurality and democratic 
institutions; solidarity and cooperation of all citizenry” (Ibid., p. 13). 
Another relevant aspect of this policy has to do with the issue of rewards. As 
security relies on everyone, not just on the State, society must provide its own 
encouragement: cooperants and informants are two important features of this 
policy which aims to prevent terrorist attacks or capture members of illegal armed 
groups (Presidencia de la República and Ministerio de Defensa 2003). But this shift 
towards rewards was also implemented for public servants, such as State military 
forces. The system of incentives that functions inside military structures was set up 
by some Ministerial Directives such as 029/2005, which regulates a system of 
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rewarding those who capture or kill in combat guerrilla leaders, and Decree 
1400/2006, which creates a Bonus System for state security force members who 
participate in Operations of National Importance (Bonificación por Operaciones de 
Importancia Nacional). Both these Directives were classified as confidential to the 
government but were replaced by other ones after the cases started to become 
public. Along with this legal rewards system, there was also revealed an informal 
rewards system inside military units, which consisted of days off and special visit 
permissions for each death that a troop could demonstrate within a specific period 
of time (Semana 2008b). 
The analysis that I intend to present here is not concerned with a personalised view 
of Álvaro Uribe. However, there has been an intensification of extrajudicial 
executions in the years in which Democratic Security Policy was implemented. 
Regarding this, the International Observation Mission on Extrajudicial Executions 
and Impunity in Colombia (CCEEU 2008b) stated that the number of extrajudicial 
execution cases allegedly committed by state security forces increased by 66% 
between 2002 and 2007, the period in which this policy was implemented, in 
comparison with 1997-2002. 
President Uribe´s proposal entails a particular vision about violence, according to 
which neither is there an internal armed conflict in Colombia nor is it a result of 
economic disparities, inequity, poverty and political invisibility (Iturralde 2010). 
Rather, violence is seen as a consequence of the attack that Colombian democratic 
society is receiving from Terrorism. .However, this enemy is not located in some 
concrete conditions of the Colombian context, it appears as an abstract: “Colombia 
is facing one of the longest-running armed conflicts in the world, with deep impact 
on all aspects of social life. In recent decades the conflict has worsened 
significantly. The illegal armed organizations have increased in size, their presence 
in the territory and the terrorist actions against civilians and economic 
infrastructure and social development, while also increasing their links with illegal 
business, such as the problem of drugs”. (Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
2003, p. 31). 
The nomination of non-state armed actors as terrorists entails a change in the 
treatment given to them, because they became excluded from any political setting 
and also they are seen as the enemy of the democracy, which covers society and 
state actions as a whole. In this perspective, other forms of disagreement regarding 
government policies run high risks of being treated in these terms (Galindo 2005). 
While Democratic Security policy prioritizes the necessity of defeating terrorism, 
demobilization of combatants was another of its goals. Peace negotiation dynamics 
were developed with Paramilitary groups through a demobilization process 
supported by the Justice and Peace Law (Ley 975/05), which was enacted in July 
2005. This legislation was the basis for the government to offer judicial pardons to 
those combatants who are involved in a peace process and want to demobilize and 
return to civilian life. After its enactment, the Constitutional Court established many 
arrangements for it through the C-370 judicial ruling in 2006, because of the 
lacunae in the legislation regarding effective demobilization but especially about 
truth and reparation guarantees for victims (Díaz 2007). "Worse still, the JPL is not 
a comprehensive plan involving all of the armed factions. Given the close ties 
between the government and paramilitaries, it comes as no surprise that in 
Colombia, the Uribe administration has focused mainly on demobilizing the 
paramilitary groups” (Easterday 2009, p. 81-82). 
Hence, the use of the term Terrorism was politically addressed to Guerrilla groups 
which were, at the same time, the main military target of the current government: 
“In sharp contrast to his conciliatory policies towards the AUC, Uribe has initiated a 
strong military policy to fight against the FARC. Uribe was elected in 2002 with a 
mandate to implement a military strategy to address the conflict”. (Laplante and 
Theidon 2006 cited Easterday 2009, p. 82). 
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Terrorism, then, is identified with an internal enemy which must be fought in the 
strongest terms: “The opposite of democratic politics is terrorism that seeks to 
impose its will by violence on others, at the cost of the lives of thousands of 
civilians (...). There can only be one answer to terrorism: defeat. Those who persist 
in using this criminal practice must bear the full weight of the law" (Presidencia de 
la República and Ministerio de Defensa 2003, p. 5-6). In so doing, the toughest 
public order measures are justified and, as Galindo (2005, p. 531) mentioned “(…) 
it should be noted that designating a group as terrorist disclaims any possibility of a 
negotiated solution to the conflict and it justifies the application of measures that 
jeopardize the protection of human rights and which extend indiscriminately to 
large sections of civil society”. 
From these considerations, the Democratic Security policy develops the idea of 
combating terrorism through the effective action of State security forces: the 
territorial control by State security forces in the zones in which it was absent4, 
along with the corresponding strengthening of such forces, and the elimination of 
drug trafficking and money laundering as the main economic activities that 
allegedly funded what the Democratic Security policy regards as the State´s 
internal enemy. 
The recovery of territorial control was implemented through specific military 
operations in all the zones in which illegal groups operated. This strategy is one of 
the phases of the Democratic Security Policy, aimed at consolidating national 
territorial control, and called the “Recovery and Consolidation cycle”. To implement 
it, the government established the design of military operations in those areas of 
the country regarded as strategic or in those in which threats had been identified 
(Presidencia de la República and Ministerio de Defensa, 2003). This idea entails the 
labeling of certain zones of the country as margins (Das and Poole, 2004) in which 
special regulations need to be made to re-establish order. The dynamics of this 
construction in Eastern Antioquia region will be considered in the next section. 
Even though one of the main principles of the Democratic Security Policy was 
“effectiveness that is measured in terms of its results and clarity, which [in turn] is 
measured in relation to Human Rights observance” (Ibid., 2003, p. 6), the goal of 
defeating terrorism through assuring territorial control by the State has implied the 
commission of various kinds of abuses by public authorities. Some of these abuses, 
such as the cases of extrajudicial executions, have ended in public scandals 
concerning the legitimacy of the activities of State agents.5. 
3. A case study of an invisible: Eastern Antioquia region (Oriente 
Antioqueño) as the margin 
In the previous section I explored the setting of the terms in which legality was 
built during the government of Álvaro Uribe in Colombia as well as the manner in 
which the discourses and practices for recovering democratic order in the country 
were conceived. In this section I will first provide a description of the case based on 
mass media reports of extrajudicial executions, and then present the approach 
made to it by an NGO that has been specially involved. Then the actions taken by 
the government in the Eastern Antioquia region as a consolidation zone will be 
explored, showing this as the margin in which the violent state imposes itself 
through the very activities of the soldiers and in which the exception could be 
                                                 
4 The internal armed conflict also reflected in the occupation of certain zones for the armed actors. The 
idea driven by democratic security policy was taking back the territorial control to the State through 
security forces´ actions in these zones. 
5 “Official government data suggest that the DSP [Democratic Security Policy] has contributed to the 
downward trend in the general indicators of violence, particularly murders and abductions rates. 
However, the number of human rights violations attributed to members of the security forces has 
increased. UNHCHR has suggested that this increase may be due to the pressure to demonstrate that 
the policy is having positive results, which creates incentives for officials to commit criminal acts”. 
(UNHCHR, 2007 cited Easterday 2009, p. 82) 
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appreciated in the practices of recovering public order through the implementation 
of body counting in each military operation, which became the banner of the 
effectiveness of the Democratic Security policy in the country. 
Since 2006, there have been statements and warnings to the national government 
by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights about 
“increasing concerns about reports of extrajudicial executions which involved state 
security force agents, mainly army men” (El Mundo 2006). These presented the 
same patterns as the Eastern Antioquia region case study that will be presented 
here. 
In the specific case of the Eastern Antioquia region, Non-Governmental 
Organizations such as the Freedom Legal Corporation (Corporación Jurídica 
Libertad)6, the local ombudsman of the municipalities of the region and the 
Interinstitutional Committee on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
(Comité Interinstitucional de Derechos Humanos y D.I.H)7 had already reported 
many extrajudicial killing cases in 2007. As Elkin Jaramillo, one of the lawyers of 
the Freedom Legal Corporation NGO (Corporación Jurídica Libertad) said “the 
Corporation has been monitoring this topic for the last five years. We have received 
more than 100 denunciations about cases that occurred in this period of time, from 
which we have been able to file and make legal claims in 70 cases. We have been 
permanently monitoring the cases by carrying out legal advice to victims in criminal 
trials and disciplinary processes that should be conducted by the Inspector 
General´s Office (Procuraduría General de la Nación) (El Mundo 2007c). 
After the CCEEU (COORDINACIÓN COLOMBIA-EUROPA-ESTADOS UNIDOS) Extrajudicial 
Execution cases in the Eastern Antioquia Region report in 2007, cases continued 
happening. Nonetheless, in the middle of 2008, Carlos Vallejo, Human Rights 
Director of Antioquia Province, “expressed disagreement with the warning about the 
alleged false positives (falsos positivos) because to his mind, often what occurs is 
that victims´ relatives want killings in combats with Guerrillas to appear as 
extrajudicial ones”. “Moreover, on many occasions common criminals committed a 
crime and they make it appear as if it was committed by state security forces” (El 
Tiempo 2008a). 
Doubts were also cast about the events by the national government. The same day 
that CINEP published a report denouncing 90 cases of extrajudicial executions 
throughout the country,8 President Álvaro Uribe said: “My government asks that 
great care should be taken to consider those complaints very carefully because…it 
is known that each time Guerrilla groups feel Military State Forces are making 
progress against them, they claim that their human rights have been violated” (El 
Tiempo 2007). 
Yet, it was only after the boom of media publicity given to the Soacha cases that 
the dimensions of the Eastern Antioquia region cases was made visible. The Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights announced the visit of 
four different international rapporteurs (El Tiempo 2009), including the UN Special 
Rapporteur for Summary, Arbitrary or Extrajudicial executions. His visit in June, 
2009 included different visits in order to interview the relatives´ victims and started 
to reassert that the cases were widespread in the whole country. 
                                                 
6 This is one of the NGOs most active in denouncing many cases of extrajudicial executions committed in 
Eastern region Antioquia and providing legal advicece to the victims´ families. For more visit: 
http://www.cjlibertad.org/. Access date: February 19, 2010. 
7 Set up in 2007 by Antioquia and Medellín Attorney-General´s Offices, Ombudsman, Antioquia Inspector 
General Office, Human Rights Attorney-General´s Unity, Medellín Ombudsman, Municipality Secretary 
and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) in Medellín, which acts 
as an advisor and observer in the Committee.  
8 CINEP is one of the organizations which with government has had many controversies. This report 
asserted that data of extrajudicial executions pose the question “whether the excessive presidential push 
for State military forces to show results in their fight against insurgency is driving them to fall into a 
perverse logic: showing positive results, even if it´s necessary to fabricate them”. (El Mundo, 2007b) 
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As an outcome of this visit, Antioquia province was shown to have the highest 
figures. The Freedom Legal Corporation (Corporación Jurídica Libertad) reported 
that 504 killings were committed in this province from January 1st, 2002 to 
December 31st, 2008. 242 of these cases came from Eastern Antioquia region, 
being the most affected population in the province (Naciones Unidas 2009). The 
impact of these killings in the region can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Map of victims of extrajudicial executions in Colombia during 
2001-2009 
Source: CINEP, 2010 
Even though information widely obtained during 2008-2010 since the public reports 
of the Soacha cases made it possible to expose Antioquia as one of the most 
affected zones in this regard, this information did not address the framework of the 
cases in this zone. Hence, the Eastern Antioquia region cases did not have the 
diffusion that the Soacha cases did. Even though it represents one of the highest 
figures in the country, it remains hidden from publicity in the mass media such as 
national newspapers and magazines, with some exceptions. That is why it is 
possible to assert that this case study is about an invisible. 
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The most complete information about the Eastern Antioquia region cases appeared 
with the CCEEU report, published in 2007, which had exceptional publicity in the 
mass media9. Thus, this case study aimed to provide the analysis of the cases, 
their context and patterns, to contrast them with the discourses and measures 
taken by the different levels of the state to respond to the existence of cases in the 
country as a whole, which were massively reported after the Soacha scandal. It is 
also a way to de-center the idea that the Soacha approach could encourage, that 
extrajudicial execution cases are isolated and scarce, as Alston (2009, p. 2) said: 
“the focus on Soacha encourages the perception that the phenomenon was limited 
both geographically and temporally”. 
Therefore, a case study of the Eastern Antioquia region is significant to understand 
and analyze how the cases arose, the patterns of these killings, and then to explore 
the responses of different state agents to them. Even though this research concerns 
the period 2008-2010, the information obtained about these years led the analysis 
of the region to the past, because the worst crisis of this kind of killings occurred 
between 2002 and 2007 (CCEEU 2007). 
The Eastern Antioquia Region case study will show how extrajudicial executions are 
related to the development of some strategic military operations under the 
Democratic Security policy, in terms of “body counting” as the measure of this 
policy´s success (CCEEU 2007). In other words, extrajudicial executions, like other 
human rights violations, entail the uses of violence by security state forces to 
construct the type of legality envisaged by the government of Álvaro Uribe: 
Democratic Security, by showing high figures of enemy deaths as an outcome of 
the fight against terrorism. 
The Eastern Antioquia Region is a crucial area in terms of territorial control, mainly 
because of the Medellín-Bogotá highway, built in the 1970s, which connects the 
region with the inner part of the country and its biodiversity, variety of farm 
products, complex communications structure and wealth of water resources, 
providing 30% of the hydropower of the country. “There is no doubt that 
competition between actors in armed conflict in eastern Antioquia relates to 
expectations regarding the appropriation and use of its enormous strategic and 
economic potential” (Observatorio del programa presidencial de Derechos Humanos 
y DIH 2004, p. 3). 
These factors have made the Eastern Region a strategic zone for illegal armed 
actors. Since the end of 1980´s, the FARC and ELN Guerrillas groups10 started to 
operate in the Eastern region, while at the same time paramilitary groups coming 
from the Magdalena Medio region and also the Metro Bloc11 started an occupation 
of the same region. They started to blame the population for collaborating with 
Guerrillas groups, so they forced many people to leave the zone, causing many 
forced displacements. The Guerrilla`s actions tend to be focused on armed attacks 
on and blockages of the Medellín-Bogotá highway as well as attacks on electricity 
infrastructure, while the paramilitary groups were focused on controlling the local 
governments and population displacement. 
In governmental terms, the Guerrillas´ actions in the Medellín-Bogotá highway 
were a matter of particular concern, since they caused the highway to be closed for 
                                                 
9 Even though there were some information and public reports that circulated in the mass media during 
2007 about the cases in the region and in the country. See (El Mundo 2006, El Mundo 2007a, El Mundo 
2007b, El Mundo 2007c, Semana 2008a) 
10 The guerrillas groups that were active in the zone were the 9 and 47 FARC fronts and the Carlos Alirio 
Buitrago and Bernardo López Arroyave ELN fronts. (CCEEU 2007) 
11 The paramilitary groups in the zone were the Magdalena Medio and Metro Blocs, which then was 
replaced by the Héroes de Granada bloc (CCEEU 2007). These groups were part of the Demobilization 
process that government initiated since 2005, which was previously described in section 2. 
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some hours at night for security reasons, blocking the traffic flow. These measures, 
however, did not assure the recovery of control over the highway by the state.12 
Given the public order conditions and the promises made by the new government 
about restoring the State presence to the whole country, IV Brigade started a 
military offensive in Eastern Antioquia region from August 2002 as part of the 
strategy of the “recuperation and consolidation cycle” of Democratic Security policy, 
which sought to “contain, disrupt and deter the illegal armed groups, protect the 
population and restore the authority of democratic institutions” (Presidencia de la 
República and Ministerio de Defensa 2003, p. 42). It started with the Meteoro 
Operation, which aimed at recovering state control over national highways, such as 
the Medellín-Bogotá one. 
Other special operations were implemented in the next years to stop the actions of 
illegal armed actors in rural areas of the region. The Marcial operation started in 
2003 and it was specially oriented to control the municipalities of Granada, 
Cocorná, San Luis, Argelia, Sonsón and San Francisco. After that the Espartaco 
operation was implemented in 2004, then the Ejemplar operation in 2005 and 
finally the Falange I and Fantasma I operations in 2006 in Abejorral, concluding the 
monitoring period of the extrajudicial execution cases in the region (CCEEU 2007). 
Even though some official reports from the government asserted that the “Critical 
situation of eastern Antioquia region started to change with the first results of the 
Marcial Operation which IV Brigade initiated in March, 2003” (Observatorio del 
Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, 2004), denunciations received 
from citizens of the zone by the Colombia-Europe-United States Coordination Group 
indicate otherwise regarding human rights violations. According to the reports, from 
August 2002 to June 2006 there were 74 cases and 110 victims of extrajudicial 
executions in Eastern Antioquia region committed by members of IV Brigade 
Military State forces. The military operations carried out by these forces were 
implemented under the Democratic Security policy guidelines (CCEEU, 2007). All 
the victims were presented as allegedly guerrilla members who were killed in 
combat. This shows how the implementation of the special operations in this zone 
made people that inhabit it embodiments of a possible enemy and, at the same 
time, how the region became the margin, in which the state´s legitimacy takes the 
central place in consolidating the idea of order (Das and Poole 2004). 
Despite the extrajudicial executions which took place in all the municipalities of the 
region, the most affected municipalities were Cocorná, Granada and San Luis in 
which occurred 74% of the cases (55 cases with 84 victims), Granada being the 
most affected with 33 cases and 49 victims (CCEEU 2007).13 
According to official reports, there were 118 combats between military forces and 
guerrilla groups in the municipalities of Cocorná, Granada and San Luis, which left 
219 dead guerrilla members. The comparison and contrast of these figures with the 
reports about extrajudicial executions reveals that t “40% of those 118 combats 
were, in fact, attacks by State military forces on the civilian population” (CCEEU 
                                                 
12 The State armed forces that operate in this region are “Juan del Corral” (GMJCO) n.° 4 troop, “Jorge 
Eduardo Sánchez” (Bajes) n.° 4 Artillery battalion, “Granaderos” counterinsurgency battalion and “BG. 
Jaime Polaina Puyo” Special SEnergetic and Vital VtPlan n.° 4 battalion, all attached to 4th National 
Army Brigade, which was led from 2001 to 2003 by General Mario Montoya, and then by General Oscar 
González in 2006 and by General Juan Pablo Rodríguez in 2007. 
13 “Considering the series of maps that record the Eastern Antioquia areas where have been the actions 
of the illegal groups fighting in the framework of operation "Marcial" in 2003, it´s possible to have a 
much clearer idea about the current dynamics of armed conflict. In the first of these maps can be seen 
how the greater effort of the army in fighting guerrillas is directed primarily toward San Francisco, 
Granada, Cocorná, San Luis and Sonsón, municipalities with the presence of Carlos Alirio Buitrago ELN 
front and 9 and 47 FARC fronts” (Observatorio del programa presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DIH, 
2004, p. 8). 
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2007, p. 33). Thus, 38% of the 219 dead guerrilla members reported correspond to 
extrajudicial executions (83 victims).14 
98 out of 110 victims registered in the period 2002-2006 were men and 12 were 
women, one of them was pregnant. Women were also victims of aggressions 
committed at the same time as their fathers; husbands; sons or brothers were 
arrested and taken away by army forces (CCEEU 2007). These issues entail the use 
of an increased level of violence upon relatives, a situation typically occurring in the 
Eastern region during the period under analysis. 
Most of the victims were farmers, 12 out of the total number of victims were 
children between 15 and 17 years old and another 3 had physical or mental 
disability (CCEEU 2007). Another common feature of these cases was the fact that 
various members of a same family were executed by State security forces. 
The strategies displayed by State military forces to make the victims of the Eastern 
Antioquia region appear as guerrilla members killed in combat presupposed 
previous stages in which it was possible to retain the person and then create a 
whole scenario resembling the occurrence of a combat. These strategies, as will be 
shown, have become more sophisticated in other cases in the country, e.g. in 
Soacha, in which victims were shot from a distance for make it appear more 
credible that they were killed in combat (Alston 2010). 
In the case of the victims in the Eastern Antioquia region, they suffered arbitrary 
detention in their own homes, in their work place or on their way there, and 
without any detention order. Victims’ relatives did not have any information about 
their beloved ones from army forces, so it could be argued that these cases 
constitute forced disappearances, which make extrajudicial execution a complex 
crime (see footnote 2, supra). In some cases the victims were previously identified 
as guerrilla members by informants or former guerrilla members (CCEEU 2007). 
After the victim is illegally retained, the military strategy continues with simulations 
of a combat by military units, by means of several and steady shootings, creating 
the semblance of a combat in the zone before proceeding with the execution. This 
allowed them to create the facts that could justify the execution as a killing 
produced in a combat as a result of a special operation which had been previously 
authorized (CCEEU 2007). Then, extrajudicial executions took place and the 
victims´ corpses were clothed with uniforms of Guerrilla groups and placed next to 
them. Weapons, landmines, grenades, etc, were also put in their hands (CCEEU 
2007, Alston 2010, Semana 2010). One of the cases in the region revealed that a 
person was clothed with guerrilla fatigues after being shot, because the pants did 
not have bullet holes although the victim was shot in the left leg, as the 
pathologist´s report stated (CCEEU 2007). 
After this, military forces move victims´ corpses to remote areas in order to impede 
them from being identified by their relatives, and buried them as NN (unknown 
name), without any identification process. This often happened although it was 
known by military agents that people had been detained in their own homes, and 
that their relatives were looking for them. In all cases analyzed, victims’ corpses 
were moved to different places from their residence (CCEEU 2007). 
All these maneuvers developed by military units altered the crime scene, plus the 
fact that they were not allowed to exert the powers of the judicial police (forensic 
activities necessary in such cases).15. This explained that they themselves were 
                                                 
14 “Jorge Eduardo Sánchez” (Bajes) n.°4 Artillery battalion was accused of committing 62% (41 victims) 
of extrajudicial executions in Eastern Antioquia region, following by Juan del Corral” (GMJCO) n.° 4 troop 
indicated as committing 21 cases. These troops conducted operations in Granada, San Luis and Cocorná, 
which explains why the highest figures of cases come from these municipalities. 
15 Even when there was a serious attempt to give these powers to Military State Forces in 2003 through 
a constitutional reform proposed in the Anti-terrorism statute, finally it was stated to be unconstitutional 
because Constitutional Court found that there were some procedural irregularities in the Congressional 
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those who provided the photographical evidence of the scene after the allegedly 
combat and who made the manipulation of evidences and victims´ corpses. 
Exceptionality is shown in the normalization of the use of military functions located 
in the boundaries of legality and illegality. The formal war on a specific enemy and 
the use of violence are both aspects that overlap and framed the extrajudicial 
executions in the framework of the implementation of the Democratic Security 
policy. In other words, the normalization of the use of exceptional measures takes 
place in the margins of these activities. 
Another important pattern in these cases has to do with the judicial processes. 
There were serious and unsolved problems of conflicting competence between the 
military and civilian justice systems for investigating the cases, given the 
complexity of the situation. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court had decided in its 
judicial rulings such as C-358 (1997) that in any case in which security force 
members act contrary to the constitutional functions of the military forces and 
where there is a minimal doubt about their activities, the cases should be 
investigated by the civilian justice system (Alston 2010). 
In some cases, Military criminal judges and the Office of the Attorney-General 
(Fiscalía) also failed to develop the preliminary procedures for prosecuting these 
cases (CCEEU 2007). In many cases carried on by the Military Courts, the 
investigations were closed because of the existence of an operation order which 
justified the combat, also taking into account the versions of the officers involved.16 
In other cases some witnesses stated that the victims were guerrilla members, 
without offering specific details about the grounds for their versions and even when 
some of them were known to live in municipalities different from the victims´ 
residence (CCEEU 2007). 
Up to February 12th, 2010, the Freedom Legal Corporation (Corporación Jurídica 
Libertad) has brought 68 judicial processes and in just two of them has there been 
a judicial ruling. This shows problems in the judicial capacity to respond to the 
complexity of the cases and the effectiveness of the investigation they demand 
(Agencia de Prensa IPC 2010). Thus, the impunity rate is so high in the Eastern 
Antioquia region cases explored so far, constituting the most generalized pattern in 
the country, reaching 98.5 percent (US Office on Colombia 2009 cited in Alston 
2010). Impunity involves a close relation to violence exerted by the state if it is 
understood that this is the main scenario in which relatives´ versions and 
narratives of alleged perpetrators could be contrasted. Furthermore, it could make 
evident the extent of the willingness of the state to accept the facts and to be 
actively engaged with the investigations. 
These cases elucidate common patterns that could be observed in the case of 
Soacha and others all over the country and that is why, to some extent, the study 
of the case of Eastern Antioquia region offers crucial clues for further research on 
extrajudicial executions. The next chapter will explain how the case of the Eastern 
Antioquia Region arises and connects with the Soacha cases. It will also approach 
                                                                                                                                               
debates about this legal reform project (See C-816/2004 for the Constitutional Court´s judicial ruling). 
Even in exceptional circumstances they can´t exercise the powers related to crime scene management 
and pathology issues. 
16 Even the very IV Brigade high ranks´ discourses didn´t offer credibility to denunciations from 
population. When General Oscar González was the commandant of IV Brigade in Antioquia in 2006, his 
response was: “DenunciationsReport are directly proportional to units´ success. It is the manner that 
some subversion supporters have to stop operations” (El Tiempo 2008b). However, several of these 
cases resulted in convictions against soldiers, as CCEEU (2007) reveals. And also when General Juan 
Pablo Rodríguez replaced him in 2007, he and his lawyers´ group asserted NGOs´ reports has to do with 
a “legal war” that does anything but demoralizing the troops. “As Guerrilla can´t defeat us in the military 
field, then neutralize with this type of strategies” and added that troops´ demand levels are much bigger 
than before, “but it doesn`t mean that we are being pushed for reporting more deaths in combat” 
(Semana 2008a). 
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the answers the State has been providing to the claims of extrajudicial execution 
cases taking place all over the country. 
4. The Violent State in action: official responses after a media boom 
The previous section explained the juncture and the framework of the Eastern 
Antioquia´s region extrajudicial execution cases as both the context of the state 
and at the margins. This section will give an account of the discourses produced by 
the main state agents and institutions involved in the case of extrajudicial 
executions, to analyze these as reactions to state illegal uses of force, as another 
way in which force is also disclosed in the media. For that reason it is beyond the 
purpose of this paper to analyze the achievements that government has obtained to 
combat illegal armed groups by regulating and enacting a different kind of rules. 
Focusing on the illegal uses of force exemplified by extrajudicial execution cases 
does not aim to deny the efforts that the implementation of some legal measures 
has achieved.17 
Discourses of state agents entail the distinction between legitimate and legitimized 
uses of violence that Weber (1921 cited in Arendt 1970, p. 35) suggests when he 
mentioned that the State is "The rule of men over men based on the means of 
legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate, violence". Legitimacy, then, appeared as an 
aspect built by legality to establish a boundary between practices that are part of 
the idea of state and those that are excluded (Das and Poole 2004), as will be seen 
in the different responses provided by state agents. 
Even though these discourses are neither linear nor invariable, the following 
analysis constitutes an attempt to characterize their main statements, contrasting 
them with some of their counter-narratives.18. It is also important to make clear 
that the different levels of the state have been in disagreement on certain points, 
which shows that it is necessary to understand the state as more than a monolithic 
entity, but rather as a diversity of practices, discourses and institutions that 
interact for to establish some relations of power. 
The classical separation of powers of the State considers that the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches are divided and between them functions a structure 
of checks and balances. In Colombia, the Attorney-General´s Office (Fiscalía 
General de la Nación) is part of the judicial branch, because of the judicial powers 
that it used to have in the criminal procedures for deciding freedom of the 
defendants. It is a hybrid office. The same is the case for institutions such as the 
Superior Council of Judicature (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura), which has 
played a central role in the debate about military courts and civilian jurisdiction for 
prosecuting the cases in which there were people killed in combat. Even when it is 
possible to follow thee categorization of separation of powers in the Colombian 
state structure, it is also important to take into account the performance of some 
state agents such as Soacha regional ombudsman (personero regional) who has 
been playing a decisive role in supporting the claims of the victims´ relatives in 
these cases. So, this point shows that it is necessary also to take into account the 
subjectivities involved in the each state institution. 
After the media boom because of the disappearance and subsequent death of a 
group of young men at hands of state security forces in Ocaña, Norte de Santander, 
different levels of the government started to issue pronouncements. I have chosen 
four crucial moments in which the different responses could be explored and 
                                                 
17 For an analysis of the achievements, see the reports CCEEU 2007, 2008a, 2008b, Alston 2009, 2010, 
CINEP 2009, 2010. Although the report made explicit references to the measures taken by the 
government in relation with the increasee or diminutionution of cases, all of them made special 
recommendations for improvinging governmental effective responses at different state levels. 
18 In constructing the narratives of the events that will be presented in this section, I will draw on 
documentary information obtained from magazines, newspapers and official statements from the 
government which have been examined and analyzed as constituting the sources of this research. 
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analyzed in action and in contrast with each other. Denial of the facts (Cohen 2001) 
is another face of the Violent State and it constitutes other relations between the 
state and violence. 
4.1. First Event: Complaints from mothers of 11 Soacha young men 
In response to the reports of the disappearances of these young men that were 
found in Ocaña (Santander) reported as guerrilla members dead in combat and 
buried as NN (Nombre Desconocido) in the local cemetery, the alarms were 
activated. 
Colombian president Álvaro Uribe Vélez said that the Legal Medicine and Attorney- 
General´s office reports had confirmed that they were dead in combat and that 
“these young men did not go to Ocaña to pick coffee” (El Colombiano 2008), by 
which he meant that they were involved in criminal activities. But, in contrast, the 
Attorney General Mario Iguarán Arana said that it was not yet established that the 
young men´s deaths were an outcome of a combat, even though the preliminary 
reports from Legal Medicine showed that the victims were fired at from a distance, 
as usually occurs in combat circumstances. He insisted that the judicial branch and 
the case attorney are the only competent authorities for established the real facts, 
after carrying out the criminal investigation and procedures. 
The Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, stated that he refused to believe that 
there still were some military units that required “body count” as the way to show 
results and he insisted in that “we prefer a foe who is demobilized rather than 
captured and one who is captured rather than dead”. .In this the Minister insisted 
on the application of the Ministerial Directive 300-28/2007, which establishes this 
priority for measuring the operational results of the Armed forces. He also 
announced the constitution of a special commission to investigate the 
disappearances of young men of Soacha, jointly with the Attorney-General Office`s 
Human Rights Unit (Unidad de Derechos Humanos de la Fiscalía General de la 
Nación). 
4.2. Second Event: dismissals of 27 military officials 
After the investigation conducted by a transitory commission of the Ministry of 
Defense regarding Soacha, it was possible to establish that not just the military 
units that operate in Santander, but also others such as XIV Brigade in Antioquia 
had been acting with negligence and a lack of control from the higher ranks. The 
failures in the command chains were based on excessive informality and 
overlooking of control requirements in the planning and authorization of military 
operations in those zones. Because of these activities, the Ministry of Defense, the 
General Commander of state armed forces and the Colombian President decided to 
dismiss 27 officials, including three generals and seven colonels. 
At this point the president emphasized negligence in the chain of command inside 
the brigades as the failure that made it possible for some military units to have 
alliances with criminal groups to recruit people and then to present them as results 
in a counterinsurgency combat. The emphasis on this point tends to focus the 
attention on a corruption concept inside the state military forces, described by 
Cohen (2001) as a partial acknowledgment: even though the government 
acknowledged the occurrence of the cases, it stated that “it was only an isolated 
incident” (Ibid., p. 113). But regarding this corruption concept, Philip Alston (2010, 
p. 9) concluded that “There have been too many killings of a similar nature to 
characterize them as isolated incidents carried out by individual rogue soldiers or 
units, or `bad apples´”. 
The legislative branch, especially the Liberal and Polo Democrático political parties 
started to press for the necessity for the Minister of Defense to assume political 
accountability for these events, taking into account that all their features are 
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related to the policies that were encouraged from that very ministry. They 
challenged him to an open debate to answer questions about enforced 
disappearances and recruitment of young people in poor zones of the country. 
Because of this large-scale dismissal, the Commander of the Colombian Army, 
General Mario Montoya, resigned his charge, even though the President continued 
to support him, based on his great achievements such as the Jaque Operation at 
the national level and the Orión operation in Medellín, when he was in charge of the 
IV Brigade. For his replacement President Uribe appointed General Óscar González, 
who was in turn the replacement of Montoya in IV Brigade leadership, despite this 
general´s positions towards the cases of extrajudicial executions in Antioquia, 
which consist of referring to the complaints of these cases as a legal-political war 
against the victory of the military forces in the fight against guerrilla terrorists (See 
footnote 16, supra). 
In Nyamuya´s terms (2002, p. 187) this strategy corresponds to the Iron Curtain 
of Secrecy, “which effectively becomes the main line of defense while the military 
describe the accusations against them as part of a black propaganda campaign 
orchestrated by guerrilla groups to undermine public confidence in the army and 
police”, presenting the work of human rights activists and organizations as against 
the state and as an insurgent one. 
Given these facts, reports of extrajudicial executions cases and the criminal 
proceedings against many military officers started to be publicized and monitored in 
more rigorous ways. The Minister of Defense insisted on the necessity of fully 
conducting investigations and he said to military officers that they must not become 
the monster that they want to combat, meaning that they should not act like the 
terrorists and criminals in terms of killing citizens. Thus, there were enacted 15 
special measures for implementing and monitoring the observance of Human Rights 
in Military activities. 
But he also affirmed that there exists a perverse interest in increasing the figures of 
extrajudicial executions. Also, the President said that the false positives cases have 
been invented, because legal foundations have been found in only 22 of hundreds 
of cases. According to Cohen´s perspective (2001, p. 106) this discourse could be 
seen as an interpretive denial: “cases did occur, but not in such gravity or amount”. 
According to the President´s standpoint, some people want to paralyze the actions 
against terrorism with these false charges against the military forces, being 
sponsored by international organizations. The Superior Council of the Judicature 
called him to give his version regarding this issue. None of these assertions take 
into account the problems that have been presented by the prosecution and the 
ensuing legal proceedings, as will be explain in more detail later, but conversely 
they put at stake the efforts of the Attorney-General´s Office (Fiscalía General de la 
Nación) and the Inspector-General´s Office (Procuraduría General de la Nación) to 
prosecute and to sanction the commission of these crimes. 
Moreover, President Uribe insisted that it was necessary to strength the judicial 
defense of military officers against false charges, to avoid their demoralization, as a 
response to this strategy. In similar terms, the High Commander of the State 
Armed Forces, General Freddy Padilla de León, said that there is a political war 
against military forces, which seeks to make the innocent appear as guilty of 
extrajudicial executions to create the image that the Colombian state committed 
crimes against humanity. This statement shows what Nyamuya (2002, p. 189) 
says: “Even in states where the rule of law is generally observed, the police and 
armed forces often resist attempts to expose alleged wrongdoing within their 
ranks". 
The Attorney- General´s office, in contrast, maintains the investigations and 
prosecutions and considers the criminal accountability of the military officers 
involved in the cases. 
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4.3. Third Event: Military officers prosecuted for extrajudicial executions were 
released 
17 military officers involved in the Soacha cases were released, after passing 209 
days detained as part of the criminal investigation in which they were involved. This 
decision was taken by a judge because of the expiration of the legal term given to 
the attorney for initiating the oral trial, after the hearing in which the charges were 
formulated. This was a very controversial decision, even criticized by United 
Nations. 
President Uribe expressed his concern about these decisions, asserting that they 
were offensive to Military forces, who only could feel released by fair judicial 
decisions that acquit or convict the implicated people. He also ; mentioned the 
necessity to go far in asking why the legal terms expired, if this was due to 
negligence in the investigation or absence of evidence. And expressed as his main 
concern the way in which the international arena could read these decisions as an 
expression of impunity driven by Colombian state. The Superior Council of the 
Judicature (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura) made some investigations and 
concluded they were not cases of deliberate delay or irregular proceedings. The 
Commander of State Armed forces and the Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva 
ordered the 17 released military officers to remain in a military unit in Bogotá while 
their judicial situation was decided, as a way of showing governmental good 
intentions to solve these cases. 
After these releases, freedom was denied for another 24 military officers in the 
Soacha cases and the judicial argumentation changed, showing that even when the 
legal term had expired, it was due to reasonable causes related to the complexity of 
the cases. 
In general terms, the governmental concerns in this event has to do more with the 
international image of impunity that Colombian state has to carry rather than a 
serious concern about why the expiration terms were occurring within a criminal 
system that has been defended by the President himself as very effective and 
trustworthy. 
4.4. Fourth Event: The United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston 
In June 2009 Philip Alston came to Colombia to investigate the extrajudicial 
executions during the internal armed conflict. After his tour all around the country 
meeting with victims, Non-Governmental Organizations, local governments, the 
President, the Minister of Defense, and the Congress, he stated that there is a 
pattern of extrajudicial executions in Colombia that has been repeated all around 
the country and it was necessary that the Military Forces acknowledge the existence 
and the extent of extrajudicial execution cases committed by them (Alston 2009). 
After his visit, he made a complete report presented in May 2010 to the United 
Nations General Assembly and another of the main points mentioned was the 
impunity rate in the cases of extrajudicial executions committed by security forces, 
which is 98.5%, and that an effective investigation and prosecution of these cases 
was necessary to overcome this scandal (Alston, 2010, p. 14). In response to this 
assertion, the Colombian Chancellor said that Colombia has been taking many 
measures since 2007 to deal with these cases and asserting that there is a high 
level of impunity is not true, based on the figures of the Attorney-General´s Office 
of the processes. 
Jurisdictional conflicts between the military and civilian criminal justice systems 
have been evident across all these events. Since the beginning of the reports of the 
cases, as it was shown in the Eastern Antioquia region cases, there were conflicts 
about which justice system should head the investigations and prosecutions. 
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According to Constitutional Court rulings, any case in which there exist doubts 
about the circumstances of facts, has to be dealt with by the civilian justice system. 
That is why in 2007 there was signed an Interinstitutional agreement between the 
Ministry of Defense and the Attorney-General´s office, which established that all 
the cases in which state security forces participated and which involved a death in 
combat should be investigated by the civilian jurisdiction, not by military courts. 
This agreement was a demonstration of good will from the government to clarify 
the facts and to avoid delays in the advances of the investigation and prosecution 
of these cases. .But even with its enactment, many conflicts of jurisdiction have still 
been occurring, as well as transfers of judges and prescription of some cases in the 
military judicial system, and lack of resources and attorneys in charge of the 
processes in the civilian justice system. In addition, this agreement was challenged 
by a lawsuit in 2009 and it was found to be illegal by the State Council, again 
generating doubts in terms of the conflicts of competence in these cases. 
Even though the Attorney-General´s Office and Inspector General´s office in 
Colombia have insisted on showing the figures and progress of their investigations 
and the legislative branch has been exerting a strong political control over the 
Minister of Defense and investigating the cases, denial is present in the State, 
especially in the executive branch, in which the Ministry of Defense, High 
Commanders of Military forces and the President are located. 
It is possible to see a denial structure in the technicalities and even in the strong 
measures taken by the government, such as the massive dismissal, because this 
decision was supported by the idea of extreme negligence, but there was not any 
acceptance of responsibility in the commission of crimes. 
On the other hand, the idea of a victimization of the Military forces puts at stake 
the risk situation of the victims´ relatives who have been denouncing the cases. 
This constitutes a denial of the victim (Cohen 2001, p. 96), because the President´s 
statements try to show that, even when reports exist, Military Forces need to be 
supported even in judicial defense terms. Other technical denials have to do with 
the idea of the existence of many false complaints or the outcomes of the current 
investigations, that show that Military criminal responsibility was proved in only a 
few cases. 
It is possible to see a contrast in the measures and responses of the different levels 
of the state. .On one hand it is possible to see the acceptance of the commission of 
killings at hands of the military forces, but on the other hand it is possible to see a 
complete strategy of denial and defending the military forces from the attacks that 
these reports represented to their overwhelming efforts in the country against the 
enemy. The latter prevails over the former. 
Finally, it is relevant to observe that the general terminology used by the State to 
talk about these crimes is false positives. The terminology of extrajudicial 
executions has been rejected by the executive branch, in contrast with the 
Attorney-General´s Office, which refers to them in the strict sense as war crimes. 
That is why they were assigned to the Human Rights Special Unit inside the 
Attorney–General´s Office throughout the country. Even though some executive 
narratives acknowledged that something happened, they refuse to accept the 
category of acts to which it is assigned (Cohen 2001, p. 77). It shows how “naming 
the violence does not reflect semantic struggles alone” (Veena Das 2003, p. 293), 
the struggle over naming is also a struggle for political and legal facts. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I have explored the relations between the State and Violence in the 
cases of extrajudicial executions which occurred in the Eastern Antioquia Region. 
Important conclusions arise from this analysis about how the state and its relations 
with violence are constructed in the practices of everyday life. 
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Firstly, this analysis took place in the specific conjuncture of the Democratic 
Security policy, distinguished by the centrality of security and recovery of order 
throughout the Colombian territory. This policy mainly entails the necessity of 
recovering the state´s territorial control over certain zones, which would be 
achieved by implementing special military operations in them. The Eastern 
Antioquia region as a consolidation territory emerges as a margin in which special 
military operations took place in order to legitimize results in the conduct of the 
fight against the enemy. In this way, the enemy was also built into this spatial 
delimitation through the killings of citizens and then through the construction of a 
legal scenario (combat) as the way of legitimizing the death and making it appear 
as legal. 
Regarding the case study, it is important to continue further research on this topic 
in Colombia given the complexities that it presented in relation with other cases, 
such as Soacha. Thus, it is of paramount importance to develop studies that allow 
us to see extrajudicial execution cases throughout all the country in interconnected 
ways, not as isolated ones. Due to the media boom that the Soacha cases produced 
in the country, they are a necessary point of departure in any study of these crimes 
in Colombia. 
Secondly, the relations between the State and Violence in this specific juncture do 
not just take place in the practices in the margin described above. They also take 
place in the discursive responses that different state levels gave in response to 
extrajudicial executions cases from Soacha. These discourses are not disconnected 
from the previous ideas and they do express the relations between the Democratic 
Security policy and uses of illegal violence in Colombia, along with the need to keep 
legitimizing the practices that take place in it. Official denial is a way to analyze 
how legitimization disguises some state practices into legality, which results in a 
democracy that is built on foundations of state tyranny. 
Thirdly, the analysis of the state in Colombia needs to be assessed from own 
perspectives, challenging the European references. As Sharma and Gupta (2006, p. 
30) say, “Both everyday and theoretical imaginings of the state are culturally 
informed, context-specific, and historical”. This work is an attempt to contribute to 
this big task. 
Finally, since violence is a fundamental element in Colombia´s formal democracy, 
the challenge of narrating the nation (Bhabha 1990) and the understanding of 
states as culturally constituted (Sharma and Gupta, 2006) require us to reveal the 
counter narratives that confront official discourses, especially those who told by the 
victims and victims´ relatives, and also those which have not been told yet by 
people who have lived and suffered this violence. These stories allows us to see the 
state not as a rhetoric abstraction, but as it is lived and narrated by flesh and blood 
citizens, who always have been mentioned as the ethereal support for state 
generalizations without being heard, said or believed. 
This consideration concerns the ways in which knowledge can give an account of 
suffering caused by legality. It is necessary, as Veena Das (2003) says, to express 
the role of social sciences in giving voice to the hurtful actions of the State, but 
most of all, in giving voice to those who themselves suffer this hurt. Thus, the 
concept of margin could be signified as the space in which criminality of the state 
could be said, in terms of its practices and in terms of its ways of defining and 
constructing specific subjectivities to legitimize the idea of order and control. 
Bearing such ideas in mind, I would like to finish by pointing out that it is in the 
consideration of subjectivity that the blurred boundaries between legal and illegal 
take other dimensions: the possibility that the victims´ relatives, in the zone in 
which Antigone from Lacan´s standpoint, could speak out, not necessarily with 
words, the criminal nature of the law (Das 2000, p. 207) and of the State which 
supports it, in their everyday life. 
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